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The California Constitution proclaims, "[a]ll political power is in-
herent in the people,"! and further provides that "[t]he initiative is the 
power of the electors to propose . . . amendments to the Constitu-
tion."2 In addition to these provisions empowering the voters to make 
law, the constitution declares that the "[r]ights guaranteed by this 
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution."3 This section embodies the doctrine of in-
dependent state grounds and means that federal interpretation of fed-
eral rights should not limit the interpretation of similar rights 
expressed in California's Declaration of Rights. The doctrine pro-
vides the basis for protecting rights in California not protected under 
the Federal Constitution. While this Article focuses on rights which 
affect those accused of crimes, California courts have relied on the 
doctrine of independent state grounds to expand the rights of Califor-
nians in other areas as well. For example, Californians have invoked 
their inalienable right to privacy4 to protect employment records, 
health records, financial records, scholastic records, and sexual his-
tory.5 The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, gives 
little protection to such information under the Federal Constitution.6 
Through the independent state grounds doctrine, the California Con-
stitution also affords Californians greater protection of their right to 
freedom of expression than does the analogous federal right? 
The voters of California, however, have recently used the initia-
tive to force the interpretation of California constitutional rights to 
depend upon interpretations of similar rights under the United States 
Constitution. This is undesirable because, although the United States 
and California Constitutions use similar language, to preserve the in-
tegrity of California's constitution, California courts should not be 
forced to follow federal precedents.8 Without such independence Cal-
ifornia's Constitution and its declaration of rights become meaningless 
1. CAL. CaNST. art. II, § 1. 
2. CAL. CaNST. art. II, § 8(a). 
3. CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 24. 
4. CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 1. 
5. Margaret C. Crosby, New Frontiers: Individual Rights Under the California Consti-
tution, 17 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 95-96 n.87-91 (1989). 
6. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (health records). 
7. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980). 
8. Of course, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
rights of Californians may not fall below what has been called the "federal floor." At a 
minimum, states are bound by the Due Process Clause, but states can grant greater rights. 
See, e.g., Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties": North Carolina 
Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1749, 1750 (1992). 
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and irrelevant. Furthermore, the voters have altered the constitu-
tional framework by a simple majority vote, allowing whim, caprice, 
and fear to dictate California constitutional interpretation. 
On June 5, 1990, California voters passed Proposition 115, the 
self-proclaimed "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act." Proposition 115 
added three sections to article I of the California Constitution9 and 
attempted to amend section 2410 of the same article.l1 These sections 
of Proposition 115,12 as well as sections of Proposition 8 (the "Victims' 
Bill of Rights, "13 adopted in June 1982), altered California's criminal 
justice system. Proposition 8 set forth the constitutional rights of 
crime victims and Proposition 115 set forth those of the people of the 
State of California.14 
These constitutional amendments create clear conflicts between 
the rights of criminal defendants and the rights of both crime victims 
and other California citizens.1s A more subtle conflict, however, ex-
ists between the right of the voters to initiate constitutional changes 
and the doctrine of independent state grounds. This conflict arises 
where California state courts rely on the state constitution to define 
the rights of Californians, but the voters elect to force the state to 
adhere to federal definitions of similarly worded rights. 
This Article addresses the process used to achieve the results of 
Propositions 8 and 115. In order to achieve greater balance between 
California's important, independent constitutional provisions and vot-
ers' rights, this Article proposes that the voters should be able to 
change California's Declaration of Rights only by a super-majority 
vote. This restriction would afford greater permanence to the funda-
mental rights set forth in California's Declaration of Rights, while still 
allowing flexibility. Greater stability of rights would give California 
9. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 14.1, 29, and 30. 
10. For text of § 24, see infra text accompanying note 263. 
11. The California Supreme Court invalidated the proposed amendment to § 24 in 
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 262-
75, 296 for a discussion of this section. 
12. The Proposition also added sections to California statutes. However, this Article 
will focus on the constitutional changes. 
13. This Article will focus on the addition of § 28 to Article I, subpart (d), the "Truth-
in-Evidence" provision. However, Proposition 8 added other subparts to the California 
Constitution. 
14. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 29 added by Proposition 115, declares the right of "the peo-
ple of the State of California ... to due process of law and to a speedy and public trial." 
15. For an analysis of each section of Proposition 115, see Lisa A. Lunsman, Proposi-
tion 115 - "The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act": Reformation of an Inept System or a 
Constitutional Disaster?, 22 U. WEST: L.A. L. REv. 59 (1991). 
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courts the ability to independently interpret the state constitution 
without being forced to adhere to federal precedent. 
Part I of this Article discusses the fundamental nature of the 
rights found in California's Declaration of Rights, and the need to 
maintain their stability. It also discusses the problems inherent in 
forcing the interpretation of California rights to follow federal inter-
pretations. Part II traces the development of the independent state 
grounds doctrine in the United States, and specifically, in California. 
Part III explains the history and procedure of the voter initiative in 
California, while Part IV' analyzes how Propositions 8 and 115 have 
limited the ability of the California judiciary to give independent 
meaning to California's Declaration of Rights. Part V examines other 
proposals and concludes that a super-majority vote for changes to the 
Declaration of Rights would best achieve a balance between the right 
of the voters to alter the Declaration of Rights and the right to an 
independent state constitution. 
I. Fundamental Rights and Forced Linkage 
The first general objective of this Article is to achieve an insula-
tion of fundamental rights from voter whim, passion, and fear. Pro-
positions 8 and 115 affect rights asserted primarily by criminal 
defendants, which are generally unpopular rights. Motivated by per-
ceptions that California "courts .. : have demonstrated more concern 
with the rights of criminals than with the rights of innocent victims,"16 
the voters have altered the constitution to restrict these "criminal 
rights" and have taken away from California courts the ability to inde-
pendently interpret the state's constitution. 
The rights set forth in California's Declaration of Rights are fun-
damental and should be permanent. A number of commentators have 
emphasized the difference between constitutions and statutory law. 
Justice Cardozo wrote, "[a] constitution states or ought to state not 
rules for the passing hour but principles for an expanding future."17 A 
constitution should "set down fundamental and enduring first princi-
ples,,18 in general terms. Former Chief Justice Traynor of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, wrote that if a constitution "is to retain respect it 
16. SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET; PRIMARY ELEcrION 34 
(June 8, 1982) (argument in favor of Proposition 8 by Mike Curb, Lieutenant Governor). 
17. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIm JUDICIAL PROCESS 24 (1921). 
18. David Fellman, What Should a State Constitution Contain?, in STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVISION 137, 156 CW. Brooke Graves ed. 1960). See also CHARLoTI'E IRVINE & 
EDWARD M. KREsKY, How TO STUDY A STATE CoNSTITUTION 2 (1962). 
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must be free from popular whim and caprice which would make of it a 
mere statute."19 
With the increased use of the voter initiative, some state constitu-
tions are no more than super-statutes. 1\vo arguments, one historical 
and one structural, support the premise that the rights found in decla-
rations of rights are fundamental. 
A. Historically Fundamental Rights 
The rights declared in article I of the California Constitution, 
similar to rights contained in other state constitutions and the Federal 
Constitution, have historically been accorded "fundamental" status.zo 
The roots of these fundamental rights have been traced back to Eng-
lish documents such as the Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right 
of 1628, and the Bill of Rights of 1689.21 Although the Petition of 
Right declared the fundamental rights of Englishmen, none of these 
documents provided for enforcement of rights.22 In fact, the Bill of 
Rights was enacted as a statute which Parliament could later amend or 
repeal.23 Despite this, the rights declared in these documents later 
formed "the core of the body of rights of Englishmen that American 
colonists claimed as inherently their own."24 Early colonial charters, 
while not enumerating rights, simply declared that the colonists re-
tained the rights of Englishmen.2S Later colonial enactments and dec-
larations began to state indiVidual rights with greater detail.26 
19. Roger Traynor, Amending the United States Constitution (1927) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of California (Berkeley»; see also Comment, California's Consti-
tutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REv. 279, 281 n.16 (1949). . 
20. This historical analysis is not based on how these rights were originally interpreted, 
or what they were intended to mean. Historically these rights have been treated as 
fundamental. 
21. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 4-47 (1980) [herein-
after SCHWARTZ, ROOTS]. 
22. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 11-14 (1977) [hereinafter 
SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS]. 
23. Id. at 1. 
24. Id. at 7. 
25. 1 SCHWARTZ, ROOTS, supra note 21, at 53. 
26. The Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People of 1639 set out the right of the 
people not to be imprisoned or dispossessed of their property before being judged under 
the laws of the province. Id. at 67-68. The 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties provided 
for the right to counsel, id. at 74, and stated that "[no] man shall be forced by Torture to 
confesse any Crime against himselfe nor any other." Id. at 79. The Boston List of Infringe-
ments and Violations of Rights included assertions of rights not previously declared in 
other documents, particularly the violation of "[o]fficers ... break[ing) thro' the sacred· 
rights of the Domicil, ransack[ing] men's houses, destroy[ing] their securities, [and] 
carry[ing] off their property." Id. at 199. 
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Virginia's Declaration of Rights and Constitution of 1776 repre-
sents the "first true Bill of Rights in the modem American sense, since 
it is the first protection for the rights of the individual to be contained 
in a Constitution adopted by the people.,,27 This Declaration re-
peated several rights found in previous documents, and included some 
new rights, such as the right against general warrants and the freedom 
of the press.28 The Virginia Declaration of Rights and Constitution 
served as the model for eight other states which adopted constitutions 
before the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in 
1787.29 The American draftsmen recognized the need to do more 
than simply declare that the colonists possessed fundamental rights. 
In contrast to their English precursors, American bills of rights pro-
vided for enforcement and insulation of "individual rights from the 
changing winds of legislative fancy."3o Their notion that certain "fun-
damental rights could not be ceded away colored the American view 
of fundamental [rights] law."31 The colonists and the Framers of the 
Federal Constitution preserved fundamental rights from frequent al-
terations by making the amendment procedures difficult.32 While fun-
damental rights enumerated in the California Constitution may be 
amended by the legislature, such an amendment must pass each house 
by a two-thirds vote and must then be approved by a majority of vot-
ers. Thus, fundamental rights are afforded a greater degree of insula-
tion than simple legislative enactments. 
B. The Structure of Constitutions 
Generally, constitutions consist of two parts. One part of a con-
stitution sets forth the framework under which the government oper-
ates, spelling out the mechanics and delineating the powers and 
27. 2 SCHWARTZ, ROOTS, supra note 21, at 231. 
28. Id. at 233. 
29. See id. at 256-382. These states and their respective years of adoption are: Penn-
sylvania (1776), id. at 262-63; Delaware (1776), id. at 276; Maryland (1776), id. at 279; 
North Carolina (1776), id. at 286; Connecticut (1776), id. at 289; Vermont (1777), id. at 319; 
Massachusetts (1780), id. at 337-39; and New Hampshire (1783) id. at 374-75. The follow-
ing states did not adopt separate Bills of Rights, but adopted constitutions which contained 
several guarantees of individual liberties: New Jersey (1776), id. at 256; Georgia (1777), id. 
at 291; New York (1777), id. at 301, and South Carolina (1778), id. at 325. See WALTER F. 
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1-29 (1910). 
30. SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 1. 
31. Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1127, 
1132 (1987). 
32. See, e.g., U.S. CaNST. art. V, requiring three-fourths of the states to approve any 
amendment proposed by two-thirds of both houses of Congress. 
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limitations on each of the three branches.33 This has been described 
as the section which imposes "internal" checks and balances upon the 
government. The second part of a constitution provides "external" 
checks which are contained in the bills or declarations of rights.34 This 
part limits the government's power over the people by declaring rights 
upon which the government must not infringe.3S, 
The Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution' consists of amend-
ments, added in 1791, four years after the Constitution was drafted. 
State constitutions adopted both before and after the convention con-
tained a declaration or bill of rights as their first article.36 These sec-
tions were separate from the sections which provided the framework 
of the state government. In fact, the title of Virginia's constitution 
was "Declaration of Rights and Constitution,'>37 according separate 
titles to the two parts. This powerfully indicates that rights listed in 
declarations of rights were viewed separately and not simply as the 
enactment of law or the framework of government.38 
Similarly, article I of the California Constitution is entitled "Dec-
laration of Rights." By setting forth rights in the first article of the 
constitution, California and other states have implicitly acknowledged 
the importance of these rights. 
c. What's Wrong With "Forced Linkage"?39 
It makes no sense to link state constitutional interpretation of 
fundamental rights to the federal interpretation of those rights. Such 
an approach eviscerates state declarations of rights: if state courts 
must adhere to federal definitions of rights, then state declarations of 
rights become superfluous. 
33. Michael Walzer, Constitutional Rights and the Shape of Civil Society, in THE CoN-
STITUTION OF THE PEoPLE 113 (Robert E. Calvert ed., 1991). 
34. Id. at 114. 
35. Id. 
36. Sherry, supra note 31, at 1132-33; Robert S. Rankin, The Bill of Rights, in MAJOR 
PROBLEMS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL REVISION 159, 160-61. (W. Brooke Graves ed., 
1960). 
37. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
38. Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual Interpretation, 53 
.ALB. L. REv. 297, 298-99 (1989). 
39. The term "forced linkage" is used to "describe the unpact of electoral decisions ... 
requiring state courts to equate state constitutional law with federal constitutional law." 
Christopher Siobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's 
"Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 653, 657 (1987). 
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David Skover has identified several other important objections to 
forced linkage or "lock-step" interpretation.40 FIrst, where federal 
precedent is ambiguous, state courts must attempt to predict how the 
United States Supreme Court would resolve the particular issue.41 
When the Supreme Court issues an opinion regarding a particular 
right, it cannot address all possible applications and permutations of 
the announced rule, and several questions must be left unanswered.42 
Lower federal courts and state courts must refine the intricacies of the 
ruling and hope the Supreme Court upholds their interpretations. 
Without the freedom, to rely on state constitutions, state judiciaries 
may become frustrated predicting the future direction of federal law. 
Second, "lock-step" interpretation "is likely to disregard signifi-
cant differences in the texts of state and federal constitutional liberty 
guarantees.,,43 Where the wording of a particular right in a state con-
stitution is different from the wording of the analogous federal right, a 
lock-step approach ignores the textual differences in favor of federal 
constitutional doctrine. As such, lock-step interpretation precludes, 
or at least discourages, any inquiry into the basis for textual differ-
ences and whether they might support different results. 
Even where textual differences could be the basis for independ-
ent interpretation, forced linkage precludes state courts from inter-
preting textually identical guarantees independently. The result is a 
"divided Constitution,"44 where some proVisions are accorded an in-
dependent interpretation while others are not. For example, as a re-
sult of Propositions 8 and 115, enforcement of the state guarantees to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and from self-incrim-
ination are now linked to federal enforcement.45 The California con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of expression,46 freedom of 
religion,47 and privacy,48 however, are still given interpretations in-
40. David M. Skover, Address: State Constitutional Law Interpretation: Out of "Lock-
Step" and Beyond "Reactive" Decisionmaking, 51 MONT. L. REv. 243 (1990). 
41. Id. at 247. 
42. For examples, see Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Fed-
eralism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035, 1054-55 (1977). 
43. Skover, supra note 40, at 247. 
44. Id. at 248 (citing Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Mon-
tana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1095, 1117-23 (1985». 
45. See infra text accompanying notes 209-14. 
46. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a). 
47. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; see also Melissa L. Nelson, Comment, Whose Beliefs Are 
Entitled to Protection: Resolving the Conflict Between the California and Federal Standards, 
27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 377 (1987). 
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dependent of federal interpretation of similar rights.49 There is no 
principled reason for linking interpretation of some rights, but not 
others, to federal precedent. 
ll. The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds 
A. Development of the Doctrine 
The doctrine of independent state group.ds is premised on the 
idea that a state constitution, particularly, a state's declaration of 
rights, is a source of rights independent of the rights set forth in the 
Federal Constitution. Although the provision in the California Con-
stitution which proclaims that "[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitu-
tion are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution,"50 was not adopted until 1974,51 this principle predates 
the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787. Before the federal 
convention even began, nine of the original states had adopted in-
dependent bills of rights.52 During the Convention, George Mason 
proposed that th,e Federal Constitution include a bill of rights, how-
ever, other delegates believed that this was not necessary, since the 
state constitutions included individual rights and guarantees.53 Fur-
thermore, while the delegates discussed the degree of power to be re-
tained by the federal government, they affirmed that the states were 
the protectors of individualliberties.54 . 
Once the Federal Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791, it was 
viewed as a restraint only upon the federal government, and was not 
binding upon the states.55 During this time, individuals had to look to 
their state constitutions to protect their rights. This period of time has 
been called the period of "dual federalism."56 
48. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 1. See also Robert S. Gerstein, California's Constitutional 
Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Private Rights, 9 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 385 (1982). 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7. 
50. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 24. 
51. This was a constitutional measure passed by the legislature and approved by the 
voters in a referendum. 
52. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
53. 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 17f1rl 588 
(19f1rl). 
54. 
55. 
. 
2 SCHWARTZ, ROOTS, supra note 21, at 436; 3 FARRAND, supra note 53, at 254. 
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). 
56. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 657 n.11. 
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After the Civil War, the federal government stepped in to protect 
individual rights against the abuses of state powerS7 by adopting the 
Fourteenth Amendment.58 The United States Supreme Court slowly 
began to give meaning to the Due Process Clause by examining 
whether certain rights provided for in the Federal Constitution were 
fundamental and applicable to the states. This period of incorpora-
tion began with Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago59 in 
which the Supreme Court determined that the Takings Clause60 ap-
plied to the states pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.61 The Court reasoned that just compensation for 
the taking of private property for public use is an "essential element 
of due process of law."62 In Gitlow v. New York,63 the Justices simply 
stated that they "may and do assume that freedom of speech and of 
the press ... are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from impairment by the States."64 The Court eventually concluded 
that all sections of the FIrst Amendment applied to the states.65 The 
Supreme Court was notably slower in applying rights embodied in the 
Fourth 66 Fifth 67 Sixth 68 and Eighth69 Amendments the "criminal , , , , 
57. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N. Y. U. L. REv. 535, 537 (1986). 
58. The Amendment states, in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
59. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
60. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
61. Chicago, 166 U.S. at 253. 
62. Id. 
63. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
64. Id. at 666. 
65. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limiting the use of 
state libel laws by public officials and public figures); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (barring state-required prayers in public schools). 
66. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNST. amend. 
IV. 
67. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. 
V. 
68. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
Fall 1993] CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 105 
rights,,,70 to the states. One of the first cases to consider the applica-
tion of these amendments to the states was Hurtardo v. California71• 
In Hurtardo, the Court determined that the FIfth Amendment re-
quirement of a grand jury indictment did not apply to the states.72 
Several years later, the Court determined in Twining v. New Jersey73 
that the privilege against self-incrimination, though important, was 
merely a rule of evidence and not a "fundamental principle of liberty 
and justice,"74 and therefore not within the meaning of due process. 
While the Warren COurt75 is usually credited with incorporating 
nearly all criminal procedural rights to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, incorporation of these 
rights actually began in 1923. In Moore v. Dempsey,76 the Supreme 
Court found that the right to a fair trial was protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Later, in Powell v. 
Alabama,7s the Supreme Court found that due process requires that 
criminal defendants in capital cases receive effective assistance of 
counsel, and applied this requirement to the states.79 In 1949, the 
Court extended the Fourth Amendment's protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures to the states.so Fmally, between the 
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
69. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or 
unusual punishments infIicted." U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII. 
70. The rights set forth in these amendments are usually asserted by criminal defend-
ants. However, these rights protect all people in the United States. It is unfortunate that 
these rights are treated as belonging only to those accused of crime. If, for example, police 
conduct an illegal search in which they do not find any evidence of a crime and they do not 
arrest the individual whose rights they have violated, the only way the individual may pres-
ently vindicate her rights is to seek administrative relief or file a civil suit, neither of which 
is a very powerful remedy. Less than avid protection of "criminal rights" has led to a 
diminution of rights for all. For example, state police have begun stopping motorists and 
then strongly suggesting that the motorist consent to a vehicle search. In South Carolina, 
out of 4,000 cars searched in 1991, drugs were discovered in less than 15%. In Penn-
sylvania, out of 583 stops, 108 resulted in arrests. Joe Hallinan, Latest Drug War Tactic: 
Car Searches on Highway, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 6, 1992, at A4. 
71. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
72. ld. at 538. 
73. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
74. ld. at 106. 
75. Earl Warren was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1953 ~o 1969. 
76. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
77. ld. at 91. 
78. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
79. ld. at 111. 
80. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). This guarantee was meaningless until the 
Court also applied the exclusionary rule to state proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
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years 1962 and 1969, the Warren Court applied eight different crimi-
nal procedural rights to the states.81 
Commentators have noted that during this period of rapid "feder-
alization" of rights, state courts stopped looking to their own constitu-
tional guarantees because it was "easy for the state courts ... to fall 
into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal constitutional 
law."82 Furthermore, states often had not provided for some rights to 
the extent demanded by the Due Process Clause. As a result, the 
Supreme Court raised state protection to the federal level. Not sur-
prisingly, most state courts looked to the guarantees pronounced by 
the United States Supreme Court and simply fell in line with that 
Court's interpretation, not considering what their own state constitu-
tion required.83 This era has been termed "co-option."84 State courts 
simply co-opted the 'United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
rights. 
Beginning with the term of Chief Justice BurgerSS and continuing 
with that of Chief Justice Rehnquist,86 the United States Supreme 
Court began to restrict the scope of the Federal Bill of Rights.87 As a 
result, state courts were motivated to look to their own constitutional 
guarantees instead of automatically relying on the federal 
counterparts.88 
(1961). William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 493 (1977). 
81. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel in all prosecutions); Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400 (1965) (accused's right to confront witnesses against her); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy and public trial); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 
363 (1966) (right to trial by an impartial jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) 
(right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 
(1969) (bar against double jeopardy). Brennan, supra note 80, at 493-94. 
82. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger 
Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 878 (1976). 
83. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 661. 
84. Id. at 657. 
85. After Earl Warren, Warren Burger was Chief Justice until 1987. 
86. William Rehnquist became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1987. 
87. See generally Slobogin, supra note 39, at 661-62 n.47; Howard, supra note 82, at 
874-76; Michael G. Colantuono, Note, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Leg-
islative Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1473 n.l 
(1987). 
88. Brennan, supra note 80, at 495-502; Brennan, supra note 57, at 548; Hans A. Linde, 
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); 
Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEx. L. REv. 
1081,1088-91 (1985) [hereinafter Mosk, State Constitutionalism]; Stanley Mosk, California 
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Although California's constitution was drafted fifty-eight years 
after the Federal Bill of Rights, the drafters of California's Declara-
tion of Rights did not rely exclusively on the first ten amendments to 
the United States Constitution. The drafters of the 1849 California 
Constitution were aware that in Barron v. Baltimore,89 the United 
States Supreme Court had announced that the guarantees embodied 
in the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Therefore, 
while certain guarantees contained in California's Declaration of 
Rights are similar to their federal counterparts, the drafters recog-
nized that the California Declaration of Rights and not the Federal 
Bill of Rights would be the source of guarantees' for the people of 
California. 
Interestingly, the 1879 version of the California Constitution ini-
tially included a section which declared the United States Constitution 
to be "the great charter of our liberties;" this language, however, was 
later rejected.90 Furthermore, while it has been stated that the protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures "equals the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution,"91 other evidence indi-
cates that the original language of the Declaration of Rights was in 
fact derived from the New York and Iowa Constitutions.92 Even if the 
provisions were intended to be identical to the Federal Constitution, 
this may simply be a result of the drafters agreement with the princi-
ples set forth in the Federal Bill of Rights, and not evidence of the 
drafters intent that the California courts adopt and follow federal in-
terpretations of similar language. In fact, evidence indicates that the 
drafters recognized the state judiciary would define the parameters of 
those provisions.93 
Constitutional Symposium: Introduction, 17 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 1 (1989) [hereinafter 
Mosk, Symposium]. 
89. 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833). 
90. SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL CoNVENTION 1878-1879 93 (1930). The California Constitution contains lan-
guage similar to the above: "The State of California is an inseparable part of the United 
States of America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land." 
CAL. CoNST. art. III, § 1. This, however, sounds more like a recognition of the Supremacy 
Clause. 
91. Ira Reiner & George Glenn Size, The Law Through a Looking Glass: Our 
Supreme Court and the Use and Abuse of the California Declaration of Rights, 23 PAC. LJ. 
1183, 1211 (1992). 
92. ROCKWELL D. HUNT, THE GENESIS OF CALIFORNIA'S FIRST CoNSTITUTION (1846-
1849) 56 (1973); Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HAsTINGS 
CoNST. L.Q. 391, 393 (1988). 
93. Jerome B. FaIk, Jr., The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972 Foreward, the State 
Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REv. 273, 283 
(1973). 
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B. Application of the Doctrine in California 
1. Dual Federalism 
[Vol. 21:95 
The period called "dual federalism"94 exemplifies the early appli-
cation of the doctrine of independent state grounds. During this pe-
riod, the United States Supreme Court had not yet required the states 
to follow the Federal Bill of Rights. California has been described as 
having lead "the nation in the development of independent interpreta-
tion. "95 Many of the fundamental rights protections the California 
Supreme Court premised on the state constitution presaged those the 
United States Supreme Court later found in the Federal Constitution. 
For example, the California Supreme Court invalidated the death pen-
alty in People v. Anderson96 four months before Furman v. Georgia<.n 
was decided. In Anderson, the court found that the drafters of the 
California Constitution purposefully drafted the phrase "cruel or unu-
sual punishment"98 rather than the "cruel and unusual,,99 language of 
the Federal Constitution. The court also looked to the history of the 
state constitutional convention and found that the drafters of the con-
stitution intended to prohibit the use of capital punishment.1OO In 
1955, six years before the United States Supreme Court applied the 
exclusionary rule to the states,t°1 the California Supreme Court 
adopted the rule.102 The California Supreme Court also determined 
that a defendant may object to the admission of evidence obtained in 
violation of another persons' rights,t°3 despite the fact that no such 
right had been recognized under the Federal Constitution.104 In inter-
preting California's guarantee against double jeopardy, the state 
94. Slobogin supra note 39, at 657 (citing Walker, American Federalism - Then and 
Now, in THE BOOK OF STATES 23, 23 (1982)). 
95. Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation 
of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297, 301 (1977); see generally Falk, supra note 
93; David J. Fme, et al. Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271, 325 (1973). 
96. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
97. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty). 
98. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (emphasis added). 
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
100. California voters subsequently overruled Anderson by passing a referendum the 
following November which amended the constitution by stating, in part, "[t]he death pen-
alty . . . shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual 
punishment." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
101. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
102. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
103. People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855 (Cal. 1955). This is known as the vicarious exclu-
sionary rule. 
104. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1941). 
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supreme court held that when a defendant does not consent to a mis-
trial, another trial would put the defendant twice in jeopardy.10S This 
ruling predated the incorporation of the federal right against double 
jeopardy,l06 and contradicted an earlier Supreme Court decision inter-
preting the federal right.107 However, California's period of "dual 
federalism" also involved many abuses by the state judiciary in the 
area of criminal rights.loS 
The California Supreme Court gave state constitutional protec-
tion to a woman's right to terminate a pregnancyl09 four years before 
the United States Supreme Court recognized the right under the Fed-
eral Constitution.110 
The recognition of these rights by California courts occurred 
before the United States Supreme Court had spoken on the issues, 
thus legitimizing the doctrine of independent state grounds. Without 
the doctrine, state courts would either have to wait until the United 
State Supreme Court has examined the issue, or guess as to how the 
Court might resolve the particular issue.lll 
The following cases illustrate the persuasive use of the independ-
ent state grounds doctrine by a California Supreme Court not bound 
by federal case law. 
In the 1955 case of People v. Cahan,112 the California Supreme 
Court revisited the issue of whether or not to adopt the exclusionary 
105. Cardenas v. Superior Court, 363 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1961). 
106. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
107. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). 
108. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (defendant questioned for 48 
hours, slapped, and held without indictment or arrest warrant); Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165 (1952) (defendant's stomach pumped to obtain narcotic capsules); Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (police entered defendant's home in his absence and wired it 
for electronic surveillance). 
109. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). 
110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
111. In a recent state appellate court case concerning the application of Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to gender-based peremptory jury challenges, the state court con-
cluded that since the United States Supreme Court had not yet extended Batson to gender-
based peremptory challenges, it "would be presumptuous on our part" to extend Batson. 
Eiland v. State, 607 A.2d 42, 59 (Md. Ct. Spec.App. 1992). However, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals, relying on the state constitution. 1Yler 
v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993). The United States Supreme Court has since agreed to 
review a case involving a state's use of peremptory strikes to exclude all men from the jury. 
J.E.B v. T.B., 660 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 2330 (May 17, 
1993). 
112. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
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rule.113 Only thirteen- years earlier in People v. Gonzales,114 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had declined to follow the federal courts in 
adopting the exclusionary rule, despite the fact that the language pro-
tecting individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures in the 
state and federal constitutions is nearly identical,1ls In overturning its 
own precedent, the California Supreme Court looked to the language 
of prior United States Supreme Court decisions to determine whether 
a majority of states had adopted the rule. The court then indepen-
dently addressed the policy arguments involved, stating that "one of 
the foremost public concerns is the police state, and recent history has 
demonstrated all too clearly how short the step is from lawless 
although efficient enforcement of the law to the stamping out of 
human rightS."116 The court went on to state that "[e]xperience has 
demonstrated ... that neither administrative, criminal nor civil reme-
dies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures. The 
innocent suffer with the guilty, and we cannot close our eyes to the 
effect the rule we adopt will have on the rights of those not before the 
COurt."117 Acknowledging that the language of the California protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures is nearly identical to 
its federal counterpart, the court stated that "[i]n developing a rule of 
evidence applicable in the state courts, this court is not bound by the 
decisions that have applied the federal rule, and if it appears that 
those decisions have developed needless refinements and distinctions, 
this court need not follow them."l1S Though the California Supreme 
Court looked to United States Supreme Court precedent for persua-
sive value, it found important reasons to reject the federal authority. 
In the same year that Cahan was decided, the California Supreme 
Court unanimously adopted the so-called "vicarious exclusionary 
rule," which the United States Supreme Court had rejected in 1942,1l9 
113. Although the United States Supreme Court had applied the rights guaranteed in 
the Fourth Amendment to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), it was not 
until 1961 that the states were bound by the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
114. 124 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1942). 
115. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CoNST. 
amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated .... " CAL. CoNST. 
art. I, § 13. 
116. Cahan, 282 P.2d at 912. 
117. Id. at 913. 
118. Id. at 915. 
119. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114-17 (1942); see also Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969). 
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The California Supreme Court in People v. Martinl20 determined that 
a defendant may object to the admission of evidence obtained in vio-
lation of another person's rightS.121 The Martin court examined the 
federal exclusionary rule and stated that its rationale was based on 
providing a remedy for a defendant who had been wronged.l22 Based 
on Cahan, the court reasoned that the California exclusionary rule is 
grounded in three ideas: (1) that other remedies are not effective; (2) 
that the government should not be able to profit from its own wrong-
doing; and (3) that the courts should not sanction such wrongdoing by 
admitting at trial the illegally obtained evidence.l23 Martin demon-
strates that although the California -Supreme Court had adopted the 
exclusionary rule, in part based on federal precedent, the court was 
not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court interpretation 
of the rule, and after careful consideration, chose not to. 
Cases that involve protection against double jeopardy provide yet 
another example of "pure independent interpretation."l24 The Cali-
fornia Declaration of Rights provides that "[p]ersons may not twice 
be put in jeopardy for the same offense .... "125 The federal counter-
part provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
[sic] to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... ~"126 Before the 
United States Supreme Court applied the federal provision to the 
states in 1969,127 the California Supreme Court addressed the question 
of whether a second trial would subject a defendant to double jeop-
ardy when the trial court declares a mistrial sua sponte without the 
defendant's consent. The United States Supreme Court had deter-
mined in Gori v. United States,l28 that such a scenario would not vio-
late the federal guarantee against double jeopardy. Despite this 
federal precedent, in 1961, in Cardenas v. Superior Court,129 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court ruled that a second trial would place the de-
fendant in double jeopardy. The California Supreme Court has 
120. 290 P.2d 855 (Cal. 1955). 
121. Id. at 857. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. While the court in Martin determined that the defendant had standing to ob-
ject to the admission of the evidence, the court ultimately decided that the evidence, in that 
case, had not been illegally obtained. Id. at 858. 
124. Johanson, supra note 95, at 306. 
125. CAL. CoNST. art. 1, § 15. 
126. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
127. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
128. 367 U.S. 364 (1961). 
129. 363 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1961). 
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maintained and upheld the Cardenas standardpO even after the 
United States Supreme Court incorporated the federal guarantee. 
These examples illustrate the capabilities of the California 
Supreme Court when it is not bound by the United States Constitu-
tion.131 These are legitimate and persuasive uses of the state constitu-
tion. Because fedenil precedent was not binding, the California 
Supreme Court looked to federal case law for persuasive guidance. It 
adopted those precedents only after careful analysis. Furthermore, 
upon adopting a federal precedent, the California Supreme Court did 
not bind itself to future pronouncements by the United States 
Supreme Court on the same subject. Instead, the court examined fed-
eral precedent, much as it would look to the precedents of sister states 
for guidance. 
2. New Federalism 
Under Chief Justice Burger's leadership, the United States 
Supreme Court curtailed many of the "progressive" standards 
adopted by the Warren COurt.132 The California Supreme Court re-
sponded by resurrecting the doctrine of independent state grounds. 
This phase, dating from the early 1970s, has been termed the "New 
Federalism.,,133 
Critics charged that since California had already adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of particular rights, the 
California Supreme Court's sudden reassertion of the doctrine was re-
sult-oriented. The criticism notwithstanding, the California Supreme 
Court employed independent state grounds legitimately. The court 
failed, however, to persuade the voters of California that the results 
followed logically and historically from California precedent. The 
court also failed to explain the analysis which it would apply in the 
future when relying on the state constitution. 
130. Curry v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 345 (Cal. 1970). 
131. I do not disagree with the incorporation of federal rights through the Due Process 
Clause of the FoU).1eenth Amendment. Without such initiative by the United States 
Supreme Court, individuals would have continued to suffer abuses and lawless behavior at 
the hands of most states. These examples illustrate the beneficial reliance upon state con-
stitutions when individuals could not rely upon federal guarantees. 
132. See Martin, supra note 8, at 1749. 
133. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 657; Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and 
the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal Procedure Rights and the New Federalism 1960-1981, 
18 GONZ. L. REv. 221 (1982-83); DONALD E. WILKES JR., The New Federalism in Criminal 
Procedure in 1984: Death o/the Phoenix?, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 166 (1985); Johansen, supra note 95, at 297. 
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In People v. Brisendine,134 the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed the scope of the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.135 Two years earlier, the United States Supreme Court 
had determined that police officers may, in a search incident to arrest, 
look inside containers incapable of holding a weapon-specifically, a 
crumpled cigarette package found in the defendant's shirt pocket.136 
Finding no Fourth Amendment violation, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the trial court could admit the seized evidence at the 
defendant's trial.137 The California Supreme Court declined to follow 
the United States Supreme Court holding, and determined that while 
an officer may conduct a search for weapons, no reason exists to 
search the contents of containers incapable of holding weapons, such 
as an opaque colored bottle and envelopes.138 To support its conclu-
sion, the California Supreme Court discussed how the independent 
nature of the state constitution allowed the court to reach a conclusion 
different from that of the United States Supreme Court.139 Justice 
Mosk summarized the history of the early bills of rights of the states, 
and explained that only the state constitution offered protection from 
the abuses of local officials.140 Writing for the four to three majority, 
Justice Mosk justified the court's ability to impose higher standards on 
searches and seizures under the California Constitution. He cited sec-
tion 24 of article one, which states: "[rlights guaranteed by this Consti-
tution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution. This declaration of rights may not be construed to im-
pair or deny others retained by the people."141 Justice Mosk also re-
lied on People v. Superior Court (Simon),142 a California case decided 
before the United States Supreme Court had ruled on the issue. In 
Simon, the California Supreme Court determined that when a defend-
ant is cited for an offense which typically has neither "instrumentali-
ties" or "fruits," a search is not justified unless there are facts which 
lead an officer to believe the defendant is armed.143 However, Simon 
was not expressly based on the California Constitution. Rather, in 
134. 531 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1975). 
135. Id. at 1105-15. 
136. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
137. Id. 
138. Brisendine, 531 P.2d at 1109. 
139. Id. at 1112. 
140. Id. at 1113. 
141. Id. at 1114. 
142. 496 P.2d 1205 (Cal. 1972). 
143. Id. at 1217. 
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Simon the court relied on both federal and state law.144 Therefore, 
although Justice Mosk implied that the court could go beyond the fed-
eral minimum, simply asserting this right alone did not further the le-
gitimacy of the doctrine of independent state grounds, especially when 
the doctrine had yet to become a routine and accepted practice. 
The Brisendine court missed a unique opportunity to persuade 
Californians not only that the independent state grounds doctrine is 
valid, but also that California case law mandates a result different 
from the federal rule. Moreover, the court declined to state any prin-
ciples or rules by which one could determine when the California 
Constitution would mandate a result contrary to federal interpreta-
tions of similar language. 
The California Supreme Court should have explained that prior 
California cases relying on federal precedent implicitly made that pre-
cedent a part of the state's law, and that the California Constitution 
required the court to maintain the prior, more stringent standards. 
The court also should have stated that, in the future, when an issue of 
constitutional law arose, the court would first look to what the Cali-
fornia constitutional, statutory, and case law required. Of course, this 
tactic may have been more successful had the California Supreme 
Court been applying the doctrine routinely and consistently through-
out the days of incorporation and during the Warren Court era, and if 
when adopting federal decisions, the court adopted them as part of 
California state law.' . 
Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde's approach is 
more persuasive and more deferential to state constitutional indepen-
dence. Under this approach, state courts first look to their own con-
stitutions and how the courts. of their state have interpreted the 
language of the state constitution. Unless this interpretation violates 
the Federal Constitution, the state court's inquiry should end.145 
The court later missed another opportunity to delineate standards 
for the application of the doctrine of independent state grounds. In 
People v. Disbrow,146 the court held that statements obtained by the 
police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona147 could not be admitted for 
the purpose of impeaching the defendant on cross-examination.148 
The United States Supreme Court had previously held that such state-
144. Id. at 1216-21. 
145. Linde, supra note 88, at 387. 
146. 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976). 
147. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
148. Disbrow, 545 P.2d at 392. 
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ments were admissible to impeach the defendant in Harris v. New 
York.149 The California Supreme Court was once again in the awk-
ward position of disagreeing with the United States Supreme Court, as 
well as having to overrule itself.lso The court extensively analyzed 
case law before Harris as well as Harris itself and concluded that it 
disagreed with its rule.1Sl The court then pointed to other courts 
which refused to adopt the Harris rule.1S2 Fmally, the court stated 
"[w]e pause finally to reaffirm the ·independent nature of the Califor-
nia Constitution and our responsibility to separately define and pro-
tect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal 
Constitution. "153 
Once again, the mere recitation of its power to interpret the Cali-
fornia Constitution independently did little to promote the acceptance 
and legitimacy of the doctrine of independent state grounds. The 
opinion would have been more persuasive if the court had detailed the 
significance of the doctrine of independent state grounds and stated 
why California case law mandated the result reached. The court 
should have enunciated a standard for analyzing issues under the Cali-
fornia, rather than the Federal, Constitution. 
It IS unfortunate that the California Supreme Court was insensi-
tive to the need to persuade the people of California of the impor-
tance of maintaining the integrity and independence of the California 
Constitution. Even early on, the voters indicated their disagreement 
with the court when they effectively overturned the court's interpreta-
tion in People v. AndersonlS4 of California's protection against "cruel 
or unusual punishment. "155 The court should have taken this as a sig-
nal that it had to be more persuasive, and even take on an educational 
role, explaining the importance of the state's constitution and the par-
ticular rights which it interpreted. 
C. Criticisms of the Doctrine in California 
Had the California Supreme Court been more consistent and per-
suasive in its application of the doctrine, perhaps we would not now 
149. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). . , 
150. In People v. Nudd, 524 P.2d 844 (Cal. 1974), by a 4-3 vote, the court had followed 
the Harris rule. 
151. Disbrow, 545 P.2d at 280. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
155. CAL. CoNSI'. art. I, § 17. 
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be faced with the present conflict between the right of the voters to 
change the constitution and the doctrine of independent state 
grounds. However, some critics argue that where the language of the 
California and Federal Constitution is nearly identical, the doctrine 
only applies when circumstances peculiar to California exist to justify 
a different result.156 It follows from this that an application of the 
doctrine consistent with state precedent would be irrelevant and that 
state courts should follow federal precedent even where this would 
require overturning state precedent. As far back as 1938, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker,157 stated that: 
[s ]tate courts in interpreting provisions of the state constitution 
are not necessarily concluded by an interpretation placed on 
similar provisions in the federal constitution ... But ... cogent 
reasons must exist before a state court in construing a provision 
of the state constitution will depart from the construction placed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar provi-
sion in the federal constitution.15s 
In Gabrielli, the court determined that the requirement that all school 
students salute the United States flag was not a violation of the stu-
dent's guarantee of freedom of religion.159 Without providing much 
state law analysis, the court concluded that since the United States 
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in two similar cases, the 
Supreme Court did not find a constitutional violation. 
Although critics of the California Supreme Court's use of the 
doctrine of independent state grounds might rely upon Gabrielli, it is 
of little analytical value; the court in Gabrielli did not provide any 
meaningful guidance as to the parameters of the doctrine of independ-
ent state grounds. The criticism rests on the notion that the California 
Constitution is independent only if it is in some way different or "pe-
culiar" from the United States Constitution. It ignores the signifi-
156. George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor - Judi-
cial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 975, 988, n.91 
(1979); John K. Van de Kamp and Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule: 
An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HAsTINGS 
LJ.1109, 1117 (1982); see also People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 283-84 {Cal. 1976) (Rich-
ardson, J., dissenting); People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1116-17 (Cal. 1975) (Burke, J., 
dissenting). 
157. 82 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1938). . 
158. [d. at 392-93 (emphasis added); see also People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 
1975) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("unless conditions peculiar to California support a different 
meaning," California courts should follow federal precedent). 
159. [d. at 392. The California constitutional counterpart to the Federal Religion 
Clause reads: "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or prefer-
ence are guaranteed .... The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion." CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 4. 
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cance of section 24 of article I which declares the independence of the 
state declaration of rights. However, if constitutional independence is 
to rest on some state peculiarity, California courts could justify a 
broader application of the exclusionary rule in cases like Disbrow and 
Brisendine by referring to the right to privacy expressly provided for 
in the California Constitution.160 Other states have relied on an ex-
press constitutional privacy right as the basis for expanded rightS.161 
Although the California Supreme Court has been reluctant to rely on 
this right with respect to criminal rights,162 this express provision 
could, as a circumstance peculiar to California, justify broader 
rightS.163 The court would not have to define explicitly the rights to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures and against self-incrimi-
nation in terms of privacy. Rather, the court could, after discussing 
California case law interpreting these rights, point to the express right 
of privacy to justify broader protections in the areas of searches and 
seizures and self-incrimination. 
Another criticism of the doctrine is that, having already adopted 
federal standards, state courts are in some way bound to future deci-
sions interpreting the same constitutional provision.l64 This argument 
ignores the proper effect of the federal standards in state laws. For 
instance, when a court adopts a case from another jurisdiction, that 
court is not then bound by subsequent cases decided by the other juris-
diction which may alter the original decision. This subsequent case 
law is merely persuasive.165 
160. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CoNST. 
art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
161. See State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984) (relying on art. II § 10 of the Montana 
Constitution and holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy as to face to face 
conversations and government recordings will not be admitted at trial, even where one 
party has consented to the recording; c.f. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)); 
State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska. 1985) (relying on art. I § 22 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion and holding that the Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) "totality of the circum-
stances" test for reviewing an affidavit for a warrant does not adequately protect state 
constitutional rights to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
162. Cf. People v. Williams, 128 Cal.App.3d. 981, 985 (1982) (noting that the California 
Supreme Court has not explained the relationship between the constitutional right of pri-
vacy and the right to be free from unreasonable seizures and searches); Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, Comment, Privacy: The New Constitutional Language and the Old Right, The 
Supreme Court of California 1974-1975, 64 CAL. L. REv. 347, 356-61 (1976). 
163. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. . 
164. See supra note 156. 
165. See, e.g., HARRy W. JONES ET.AL., LEGAL METIiOD 5-8 (2d ed. 1980). 
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m. The Voter Initiative 
A. The History 
In 1913, former President and United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice William Taft predicted that "the movement [to direct democracy] 
will come to an end by the non-use of the referendum, as the people 
shall see the absurdities into which it is likely to lead them.,,166 Con-
trary to Taft's prediction, twenty-three states now allow the use of the 
initiative and referendum.167 Since 1898, there have been more than 
17,000 propositions placed on state ballotS.168 Although the use of 
this direct democracy has gone through periods of little or no use, it 
has become immensely popular.169 
The progressive reformers of the first two decades of this century 
promoted the use of the initiative and referendum as tools to advance 
direct democracy.17o The reforms advocated by the progressives were 
intended to "[g]ive the government back to the people"l71 due to the 
growing distrust of political organizations. The initiative, referendum, 
recall, and direct primary were intended to infuse representative gov-
ernment with a degree of direct democracy.172 At the core of these 
reforms was the belief that citizen involvement in government would 
improve government and limit the power of special interests.173 
The Progressive Movement came to California in 1908.174 The 
1879 California Constitution already required public ratification of 
constitutional amendments as well as referral of certain topics to the 
voters.175 The "Progressives" in California, a faction of the California 
Republican party, sought to achieve greater voter influence and con-
trol in an effort to limit the power of special interest groups and re-
166. WILLIAM H. TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 71 (1913). 
167. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CrnzEN LAWMAKERS: 'Iim BALLOT lNmATIVE REvOLU-
TION 40 (1989). 
168. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIREcr LEGISLATION: VOTING OF BALLOT PROPosmONS 
IN TIm UNITED STATES 70 (1984). 
169. SCHMIDT, supra note 167, at 15-23; MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 5. 
170. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 20; WINSTON W. CROUCH ET AL., CALIFORNIA Gov-
ERNMENT AND POLmCS 93 (3d ed. 1964). 
171. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 21. 
172 .. ld. 
173. ld. at 22. However, Magleby also questions the true motivation behind the Pro-
gressive movement. ld. at 24-25 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADER, 'Iim AGE OF REFORM 131-
73 (1955) (suggesting that many Progressives were middle-class, urban, well educated, and 
often self-employed businesspeople, and that the reforms sought were merely a way to 
increase their influence on public policy». ' 
174. CROUCH, supra note 170, at 93. 
175. ld. at 94. 
Fall 1993J CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 119 
. 
duce corruption by political machines.176 More specifically, popular 
disgust with Boss Herren and the Southern Pacific political machine 
fueled the spark for reform.l77 After successfully prosecuting Abra-
ham Ruef, a San Francisco political boss, Hiram W. Johnson was 
elected Governor of California.178 Johnson promoted the successful 
adoption of progressive reforms in California, including the voter 
initiative. 
B. The Process 
In California, an individual or a group may draft amendments to 
the state constitution or statutory law.179 After drafting a proposed 
amendment, the proponents submit it to the Attorney General who 
prepares a title and a summary of the measure and certifies the initia-
tive.1so The proponents then have 150 days to gather a number of 
signatures, based on a percentage of the electoral votes cast in the 
most recent gubernatorial election.181 To place a statutory change on 
the ballot requires five percent of the vote/52 while a constitutional 
amendment requires eight percent.183 Once on the ballot, the initia-
tive will be adopted if a simple majority of the voters voting on the 
specific initiative opt to accept it.l84 There are a few restrictions on 
proposals. FIrst, "[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one 
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."185 
Further, the California Supreme Court has interpreted the California 
Constitution to require that all of a proposition's parts be "reasonably 
germane."lS6 Second, an initiative to amend the constitution will not 
be effective if it amounts to a revision of the constitution.l87 ~inally, 
176. Eugene C. Lee, California, in REFERENDUMS: A CaMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRAC-
TICE AND THEORY '07, 88-89 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978). 
177. CROUCH, supra note 170, at 94. 
178. Id. at 54. 
179. The California Constitution allows individuals to submit statutory changes to the 
voters as well. CAL. CaNST. art. II, § 8. However, the focus here is on constitutional 
amendments by initiative. 
180. Id. 
181. CAL. ELEe. CaDE § 3513 (West 1977). 
182. CAL. CaNST. art. II, § 8(b). 
183. Id. 
184. For a description of requirements in other states, see MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 
38-40, tbl. 3.1. 
185. CAL. CaNST. art. II, § 8( d). 
186. Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1949); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. 
Dist. v. State Bd. of EqUalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Cal. 1978). 
187. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 7'07, 789 (Cal. 1948). For more discussion of this 
limitation, see infra text accompanying notes 258-74. 
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constitutional amendments must not violate the United States 
Constitution.188 
c. The Problems 
From 1911, when the initiative was enacted in California, to 1988, 
179 initiatives were placed on the statewide ballot.189 One hundred 
and three of those initiatives proposed constitutional amendments.190 
Californians have clearly taken advantage of their right to participate 
in the government of their state, and studies indicate that the initiative 
has reduced voter apathy and increased political awareness and partic-
ipation.191 Nonetheless, the voter initiative is not a political panacea 
and it has drawn recurrent criticism. While some of these criticisms 
are interrelated, this Article focuses primarily on those relevant to the 
thesis, although other criticisms are considered briefly. 
The first criticism of the voter initiative states that a substantial 
number of people eligible to vote are unable to comprehend the nu-
merous and complex initiatives on which they must make a deci-
sion.l92 Most propositions require that readers have the reading level 
of a third-year college student.193 Even if a voter has the level of edu-
cation necessary to understand the initiatives, it is unlikely that the 
voter is able to devote the amount of time necessary to understand the 
proposed initiatives. Unlike elected representatives, whose full-time 
employment includes analyzing proposed legislation, members of the 
electorate may find it difficult to devote much time to examining the 
voter handbook containing the proposed new law.194 
Another criticism is that not all eligible voters vote on initiatives; 
thus, those who do vote effectively represent everyone else. Due to 
low voter turnout, the initiative process effectively becomes represen-
tative government, and representative government is precisely what 
direct democracy seeks to avoid. The problem is that the initiative 
188. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see also Gordon E. Baker, American 
Conceptions of Direct Vzs-a-Vzs Representative Governance, 5 CLAREMONT J. PUB. AFF.9-
10 (1977); James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Post-
script to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 881, 890 (1970). 
189. PHILIP L. DUBOIS AND FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA lNmA-
TIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 16-17, tbl. 3 (1992). 
190. Id. 
191. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 13-14. 
192. Id. at 138-39. 
193. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1509 
(1990). 
194. DAVID BUTLER & AUSTIN RANNEy, Theory, in REFERENDUMS: A CoMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 34 (1978). 
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process does not possess the same checks as representative govern-
ment. The legislative process provides the opportunity to deliberate, 
debate, revise, and compromise before representatives vote on the fi-
nal version of a bill. To enact a change in California statutory law, a 
bill must obtain a majority vote from each house.195 Amending the 
California Constitution requires a two-thirds vote from each house 
before the proposal goes before the voters; the constitutional amend-
ment becomes law only if it receives a majority vote at the polls.196 
By contrast, the initiative process circumvents the "deliberate and 
debate" stage. Once the Attorney General has certified a measure, 
there may be only limited changes to the language of the initiative,197 
permitting few compromises and requiring the voters to accept or re-
ject the measure as presented. Passage of an initiative requires only a 
majority vote, regardless of whether the measure proposes statutory 
or constitutional changes.198 
Another problem with the initiative is that it no longer serves one 
of its original purposes. The initiative process as originally conceived 
was meant to avoid the domination of the legislature by powerful in-
. terest groupS.199 Today, however, interest groups dominate the initia-
tive process.2oo 
A final and most significant criticism is that constitutional change 
by voter initiative allows for unchecked "majority tyranny." As dis-
cussed, declarations of rights protect fundamental rights from state in-
trusion. The initiative process endangers those rights, however, by 
raising the possibility that popular will may restrict unpopular rights. 
This is especially true with respect to rights thought of as belonging 
only to criminal defendants. Because these rights are especially sus-
ceptible to popular passions and fears, it is even more important to 
insulate them from voter whim. While voters should have the oppor-
tunity to change the constitution, this right should be somewhat re-
stricted in order to preserve the fundamental rights of all 
Californians.201 
195. CAL. CoNST. art. IV, § 8(b). 
196. CAL. CoNST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
197. CAL. ELEc. CoDE §§ 3505 (West Supp. 1993). 
198. CAL. ELEc. CODE § 54 (West 1977) 
199. Lee, supra note 176, at 88-89. 
200. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JuSTICE 103 (1989). 
201. Unfortunately, the popular perspective tends to be one of outrage when a defend-
ant "gets off on a technicality." The "technicality," however, is often that the state has in 
some way violated the defendant's rights. For example, the police may have conducted an 
illegal search of the defendant's home. In such a situation the exclusionary rule operates to 
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The major criticisms of the initiative do not address the need for 
preserving the independence of the California Constitution. While 
the majority may vote to curtail unpopular rights, they may do so only 
to the extent that such changes do not fall below the level of protec-
tion provided for in the Federal Constitution. If voters continue to 
adopt "forced linkage" of federal interpretation of federal rights, the 
California Declaration of Rights will be superfluous. 
IV. Propositions' 8 and 115 • Voter Backlash 
A. The Backlash 
During the "New Federalism" period, the California Supreme 
Court consistently declined opportunities to bolster the legitimacy of 
the doctrine of independent state grounds and further declined to em-
phasize that the California Constitution mandates results independent 
of United States Supreme Court decisions.202 This mistake spurred a 
voter revolt. 
1. Proposition 8 
In June of 1982, the California voters passed Proposition 8, the 
self-proclaimed "Victims' Bill of Rights." While this initiative ef-
fected several changes to the California Constitution and statutory 
scheme,203 the focus here is on section 28( d), added to the constitu-
tion's Declaration of Rights. In particular, the 'IRight to Truth-in-Evi-
dence"204 section provides that "relevant evidence shall not be 
excluded in any criminal proceeding.,,20s 
exclude the admission of any evidence which was obtained pursuant to the violation of the 
right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." 
202. See supra notes 132-55 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra note 13. 
204. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 28( d). 
205. Id. The full section states: 
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded 
in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and 
hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether 
heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing 
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sec-
tions 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or 
constitutional right of the press. 
CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 28(d). For discussions on the practical impact of section 28(d) on 
California evidence law, see Hank M. Goldberg, The Impact of Proposition 8 on Prior 
Misconduct Impeachment Evidence in California Criminal Cases, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 621 
(1991); Mark Dyer Klein & Randall A. Cohen, Comment, Proposition 8: California Law 
After In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PEPP. L. REv. 1059 (1985). 
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After the measure survived constitutional challenges,206 and was 
held to apply only to crimes committed on or after its effective date,207 
the California Supreme Court was forced to reexamine its use of in-
dependent state grounds with respect to the exclusionary rule. In the 
following two cases, the state's highest coUrt interpreted the section 
overbroadly in order to achieve the result the voters presumably 
wanted. While it is important to ascertain the intent of a drafting 
body such as the legislature, courts should recognize the differences 
between law that comes from the legislature and that which comes 
from the voters. As discussed, the processes of enacting law by voter 
initiative and that of legislative law-making are very different.208 Em-
phasizing the intent of the voters is particularly troubling. Where an 
initiative alters fundamental rights, courts should be especially wary of 
relying on ambiguous voter intent to justify unnecessarily broad inter-
pretations of the initiative. 
In In re Lance W.,209 the court addressed whether the vicarious 
exclusionary rule established in People v. Martin210 survived section 
28( d). In a four to three decision, the court held it did not. In Lance 
w., the court determined that the intent of the voters was to "elimi-
nate a judicially created remedy for violations of search and seizure 
provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, ... except to the ex-
tent that exclusion remains federally compelled."211 
The majority held that the voters had expressed their intent that 
the "exclusion of evidence is not an acceptable means of implement-
ing [the right to be free from unreasonable seizures and searches], ex-
cept as required by the Constitution of the United States,,,212 and that 
section 28( d) "abrogated both the vicarious exclusionary rule ... and 
a defendant's right to object to and suppress evidence seized in viola-
tion of the California, but not the Federal, Constitution. ,,213 
Conspicuously absent in section 28( d) is any mention of the doc-
trine of independent state grounds, or of the Federal Constitution. 
The official legislative analyst merely states that "[t]his measure gen-
erally would allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal 
cases. . .. The measure could not affect federal restrictions on the use 
206. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982). 
207. People v. Smith, 667 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Cal. 1983). 
208. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text. 
209. 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985). 
210. 290 P.2d 855 (Cal. 1955). 
211. Lance w., 694 P.2d at 752. 
212. ld. 
213. ld. at 747. 
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of evidence.,,214 The court held that section 28{ d) had not implicitly 
repealed two clauses of the Declaration of Rights, one which states 
that "[rlights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on 
those guaranteed by the United States Constitution,,,215 and another 
protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.216 Instead, the 
court concluded that the rights stated in sections 13 and 24 still ex-
isted, but Proposition 8 eliminated the remedy of excluding illegally 
obtained evidence.217 This contradicts th~ conclusion in People v. 
Cahan218 that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is the only 
effective remedy.219 
The other significant "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" decision is 
People v. May.220 In May, the issue was whether the rule in People v. 
Disbrow,221 barring the admission of statements for impeachment pur-
poses that were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,222 sur-
vived Proposition 8. The court concluded that, indeed, Disbrow had 
been abrogated.223 The decision turned on the interpretation of the 
savings clause of section 28( d). SectiQn 28( d) states in pertinent part, 
"[n]othing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evi-
dence relating to privilege or hearsay .... "224 
In his dissent, Justice Mosk argued the rule in Disbrow consti-
tuted an "existing statutory rule relating to evidence.,,225 Justice Mosk 
based this on the California Evidence Code, which defines a privilege 
pursuant to the California and Federal Constitutions.226 Justice Mosk 
contended that in Disbrow, the court did not simply provide a remedy 
for illegally obtained statements. Rather, the court in Disbrow de-
clared that "the privilege against self-incrimination ... precludes use 
by the prosecution of any extrajudicial statement by the defendant ... 
either as affirmative evidence or for the purposes of impeachment, ob-
tained during custodial interrogation in violation of the standards de-
clared in Miranda and its California progeny.,,227 This statement by 
214. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 16, at 32. 
215. CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 24. 
216. CAL. CaNST., art. I, § 13. 
217. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 756. 
218. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
219. leI. at 913. 
220. 748 P.2d 307 (Cal. 1988). 
221. 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976). 
222. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
223. May, 748 P.2d at 312-13. 
224. CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 28( d). 
225. May, 748 P.2d at 314-18 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
226. leI. 
227. leI. at 314 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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the Disbrow court interprets the California Constitution as protecting 
Californians from the use of illegally obtained statements. That is, 
when the state uses such statements in a trial against the defendant, 
the defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated. Thus, the 
rule in Disbrow did not simply provide a remedy for the initial viola-
tion of the privilege when the police illegally obtain a statement. 
Rather, Disbrow articulated the extent of the privilege itself. 
Nonetheless, relying extensively on the court of appeal's opinion, 
a majority of the California Supreme Court determined that the rule 
in Disbrow did not purport to "define the scope of the California con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination now set forth in article 
I, section 15."228 Rather, the court stated, "[i]n Disbrow, ... the court 
created a new remedy for violations of Miranda, but did not reinter-
pret or extend the scope of the substantive rights protected by the 
Constitution."229 Essentially, the court concluded that the Disbrow 
rule was not mandated by the California Constitution, and was there-
fore merely a judicially-created remedy. Refusing to read section 
28( d) narrowly, the California Supreme Court relied on the presumed 
intent of the voters. The court determined that the "probable aim of 
the voters in adopting section 28(d) ... [was] to dispense with exclu-
sionary rules derived solely from the state Constitution .... "230 The 
court also stated that "it seems very likely that Proposition 8 was 
crafted for the very purpose ... of abrogating cases such as Disbrow 
.... "231 Furthermore, "the voters probably intended to preserve leg-
islatively created evidentiary rules."232 Despite apparent uncertainty, 
the California Supreme Court adhered to the presumed intent of the 
voters. 
Proposition 8 claimed to have the support of prosecutors and 
other law enforcement officials, and it is likely that these groups did 
intend to overturn rulings such as Disbrow.233 Nevertheless, the 
court's uncertainty regarding voter intent, coupled with the broad and 
ambiguous language of section 28( d), should have caused the court to 
hesitate in restricting rights such as the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
While the court's decisions in May and Lance W. deserve criti-
cism, the political pressures on the California Supreme Court must be 
228. Id. at 311. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 312 (emphasis added). 
231. Id. (emphasis added). 
232. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). 
233. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 16, at 35. 
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considered. In 1986, the voters elected to recall three of the court's 
justices, including Chief Justice Rose Bird.234 The public was out-
raged by the court's overturning death convictions or sentences on 
what appeared to be "technical" grounds. The voters sent a message 
to the justices to change their .ways, or else. The justices <must have 
interpreted the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision's silence on 
the doctrine of independent state grounds and the vagueness of voter 
intent in light of this political climate. 
Following Lance ·W. and May, California courts have used overly 
broad interpretations of section 28( d).235 This has resulted in a chip-
ping away of the California Constitution's independence in other ar-
eas of criminal proced~e law. In People v. EppS,236 the appellate 
court determined that California courts must follow federal precedent 
not only when the suppression of evidence is involved, but also when 
dismissing charges against the defendant is the "remedy." In Epps, 
the state failed to properly preserve physical evidence which was im-
portant to the defendant's position. The court determined that Propo-
sition 8 applied to this situation-despite the fact that admissibility of 
evidence was not an issue. The court reasoned that "where the evi-
dence allegedly lost or destroyed is potentially exculpatory, and the 
usual remedy is exclusion of evidence potentially inculpatory, the 
functional remedial equivalent of exclusion of evidence is dismissal 
.... "237 Thus, where a defendant's right to "access to evjdence"238 
has been violated and the court would have to dismiss the case under 
the California Constitution, pursuant to section 28( d), the court must 
not dismiss unless necessary under the Federal Constitution. Section 
28( d) says nothing about dismissals, and only addresses the admissibil-
ity of evidence. 
234. See Eule, supra note 193, at 1581-82; see also Gerald F. Uelman, Supreme Court 
Retention Elections in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 333 (1988). 
235. See People v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1065-66 (Cal. 1989) (regarding exclusion of 
evidence tests when demonstrative evidence is lost or destroyed); see also People v. Valen-
cia, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 816-19 (1990); People v. Lopez, 198 Cal. App. 3d 135,142-44 
(1988) (regarding defendant's right to compulsory process to secure the testimony of de-
fense witnesses). In all of these cases, the courts concluded that Section 28( d) required the 
state courts to adhere to federal precedent. 
236. 182 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (1986). 
237. Id. at 1115. 
238. California v. 'il:ombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). 
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2. Proposition 115 
In an attempt to require the California courts to further adhere to 
federal precedent with respect to nearly all constitutional issues, the 
voters passed Proposition 115 on June 5, 1990. 
Similar to the court's broad interpretation of Proposition 8, the 
California Supreme Court has also given great deference to the 
voter's presumed intent in approving Proposition 115. Although the 
court held one section of Proposition 115 constituted an invalid revi~ 
sion of the constitution,:239 the court has broadly interpreted other 
constitutional changes made by Proposition 115. For example, section 
30(c) establishes reciprocal discovery in criminal cases, stating: "[i]n 
order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases 
shall be reciprocal in nature . . . ."240 . 
Prior California case law had established that "[t]he People must 
'shoulder the entire load' of their burden of proof in their case in 
chief, without assistance either from the defendant's silence or from 
his compelled testimony."241 Federal precedents interpreting the fed-
eral privilege against self-incrimination rest on the rationale that the 
privilege "'is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, 
not to the information that may incriminate him.,,,242 In contrast, the 
California Supreme Court has relied on the policy of requiring the 
prosecution to "'investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove 
its own facts, and convince the jury through its own resources.' "243 
Although initially the California Supreme Court had looked to federal 
precedent244 in interpreting the guarantee,245 the court later stated 
239. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); see infra text accompanying 
notes 258-76, 296. 
240.' CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 30(c). 
241. In re Misener, 698 P2d 637, 640 (Cal. 1985) (quoting Prudhomme v. Superior 
Court, 466 P.2d 673, 676 (Cal. 1970)). 
242. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975) (quoting Couch v. United States, 
409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)) (holding that statements made by persons other than the defend-
ant are outside the scope of the self-incrimination clause). 
243. Misener, 698 P.2d at 646 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) 
(Black, J., concurring and dissenting)). 
244. In Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 466 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1970), the court examined the 
federal trend of broadening the rights against self-incrimination. The Prudhomme court 
noted Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Federal Constitution forbid the trial court and the prosecution from commenting on the 
defendant's failure to testify, or upon a defendant's reliance on the privilege against self-
incrimination. Another case discussed as part of this trend was Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), which broadened the accusatory stage to which the privilege applies. Also 
mentioned was Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which applied the federal guarantee 
against self-incrimination to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment The court in Prudhomme noted that the United States Supreme Court had 
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that "Prudhomme [v. Superior Court] put this court on record as being 
considerably more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination 
than federal law currently requires."246 In Allen v. Superior Court,247 
the court had acknowledged that the federal standard was inconsistent 
with the California court's interpretation of the privilege. The court 
"affirm[ ed] the continued vitality of the stringent standards set forth 
in Prudhomme for the protection of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation as embodied in article I, section 15."248 
In Izazaga v. Superior Court,249 however, the supreme court con-
fronted the question of whether prior case law regarding both recipro-
cal discovery and California's protection against self-incrimination 
survived section 30( c). The court noted that "the California Constitu-
tion continues to afford criminal defendants an independent source of 
protection from infringement of certain rights, including the privilege 
against self-incrimination,"25o but went on to hold that section 30(c) 
"constitutes a specific exception to the broad privilege against self-
incrimination set forth in article I, section 15."251 Section 30(c) says 
nothing about the privilege against self-incrimination, however, nor 
do the statutory changes relating to reciprocal discovery enacted by 
Proposition 115.252 As to section 30(c) specifically, the legislative ana-
lyst stated that "[t]his measure ... [c]hanges the rule under which 
prosecutors and defense attorneys must reveal information to each 
other in their prospective criminal cases [and] [r]epeals the require-
ment that a copy of the arrest report be delivered to the defendant at 
the initial court appearance, or within two days of the appearance."253 
This does not explain how the proposition changes criminal discovery 
rules. Furthermore, this analysis could be interpreted as explaining 
that the only rule changed is the rule regarding delivery of the arrest 
report to the defendant. Thus, despite the fact that section 30( c) is 
silent as to its effect on the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
recently granted certiorari in Williams v. Florida, 224 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1969) (holding that 
Florida's alibi statute did not violate the FIfth Amendment). The Court in Williams ulti-
mately held that the statute did not violate the FIfth Amendment. Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970). 
245. U.S. CON ST. amend. V. 
246. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 528 P.2d 45, 50 (Cal. 1974). 
247. 557 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1976). 
248. ld. at 67. 
249. 815 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1991). 
250. ld. at 314. 
251. ld. 
252. See CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1993). 
253. SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: PRIMARY ELECTION 33 
(1990). 
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court adopted a rule of construction which allows implicit, albeit par-
tial, repeal of California's privilege against self-incrimination. A ma-
jority of the court determined that section 30(c) was a specific 
exception to the privilege against self-incrimination, allowing recipro-
cal discovery to the extent federal precedent allows it.254 
The court's interpretation of section 30(c), however, made the at-
tempted change to section 24 redundant.255 Justice Mosk dissented 
from the court's broad interpretation of section 30( c) despite the fail-
ure of the proposed amendment to section 24. He argued that section 
30(c) could not restrict a defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as interpreted in Prudhomme unless the voters had effectively 
forced California courts to follow federal interpretations of the federal 
right against self-incrimination which he concluded they had not 
done.256 The court once again deferred to the presumed will of the 
voters, and interpreted the proposition to link California self-incrimi-
nation law to federal precedent.257 
B. Amendment or Revision? 
The California Supreme Court has not only broadly interpreted 
specific provisions of initiatives in an attempt to further the presumed 
will of the voters, but has also loosely applied the two principal restric-
tions on the use of the initiative, the "no revision rule" and the "sin-
gle-subject rule."258 As a result, initiatives can easily overcome 
substantive restrictions and can be broadly interpreted even if they 
restrict or conflict with pre-existing rights. 
According to the California Constitution, while the voters may 
amend the constitution, they may not revise it.259 The distinction be-
254. Izazaga, 815 P.2d at 313-14. 
255. See id. at 333 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
256. Id. at 332 for a discussion of the proposed change to Art. I, § 24, see infra text 
accompanying notes 258-74, 296. 
257. See id. at 314, 314 n.9. 
258. The single-subject rule is that "[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one 
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect." CAL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 8( d). For a more detailed discussion of the single-subject rule, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, 
California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REv. 936 (1983) (arguing 
for the continued use of the "reasonably germane" standard). But see Steven W. Ray, 
Comment, The California Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single-Subject Rule, 14 
PAC. LJ. 1095 (1983) (arguing for a stricter interpretation of the single-subject rule). 
259. "The electors may amend the Constitution by initiative." CAL. CaNST. art. XVIII, 
§ 3 (emphasis added). "[A] revision of the constitution may be accomplished only by con-
vening a constitutional convention and obtaining popular ratification, or by legislative sub-
mission of the measure to the voters." Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Cal. 
1990) (interpreting CAL. CaNST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-2). 
130 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:95 
tween an amendment and a revision is quite gray, and the constitution 
does not define these terms. A court faces the dilemma of either ap-
plying the "no revision rule" strictly and facing accusations of frustrat-
ing voter will, or applying the restriction loosely but having to 
reconcile an initiative with conflicting provisions in California's Decla-
ration of Rights.260 This quandary underscores the need for a super-
majority vote in order to enact any initiative altering the Declaration 
of Rights. Where seventy-five percent of the voters approve of a 
change to the Declaration of Rights, the issue of revision or amend-
ment may no longer be relevant. 
To its credit, the California Supreme Court, in Raven v. 
Deukmejian, invalidated a section of Proposition 115 which would 
have abolished the doctrine of independent state grounds with respect 
to at least thirty-two constitutional rightS.261 One section of Proposi-
tion 115 added the following language to the California provision: 
"[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution."262 The provision 
continued: 
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of 
the laws, to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to 
be personally present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, 
to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses 
against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, to privacy, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the 
same offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unu-
sual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this state in a 
manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This 
Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford 
greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal 
causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the United 
States.263 
Despite the fact that this proposition passed in the special election, 
the California Supreme Court held that it would not be enforced be-
cause it constituted a revision of the constitution,264 which may only 
be accomplished by a constitutional convention265 or by legislative 
submission of the measure to the voters.266 The California Supreme 
260. See infra notes 261-74, 296 and accompanying text. 
261. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089. 
262. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
263. Id. (emphasis added). 
264. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089. 
265. CAL. CoNST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
266. CAL. CoNST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
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Court looked to rules established in prior case law to determine 
whether this section constituted a revision or an amendment. 
In McFadden v. Jordan,267 the court invalidated as a revision a 
purported constitutional amendment. The measure in McFadden was 
called the "California Bill of Rights:' and contained 12 separate sec-
tions, 208 subsections and more than 21,000 words.26s Furthermore, 
the measure included sections covering subjects such as a pension 
commission, wagering and gaming, oleomargarine, healing arts, civic 
centers, and surface mining.269 The court held that the title of the 
initiative created "a misleading and confusing conflict in terminology 
of titles and related subject matter .... ' with California's Declaration 
of Rights.270 The court found that "at least 15 of the 25 articles con-
tained in our present Constitution would be repealed either in their 
entirety or substantially altered by the measure, a minimum of four 
... new topics would be treated, and the functions of both the legisla-
tive and the judicial branches of our state government would be sub-
stantially curtailed!'271 In holding that the initiative constituted an 
invalid revision of the constitution, the court determined that, given 
the multifarious and far-reaching provisions in that particular initia-
tive, it was unnecessary to "undertake to define with nicety the line of 
demarcation" between an amendment and a revision.272 Instead, the 
court stated that "[e]ach situation ... must; we think, be resolved 
upon its own facts!'273 
In Raven, the section in dispute only changed the independent 
nature of the California Constitution as to specific rights. This sec-
tion, however, necessarily affected other provisions in the Declaration 
of Rights by proclaiming each of the rights enumerated in the new 
section 24. The Raven court correctly pointed out that the new section 
24 implicated "fundamental constitutional rights . . . including the 
rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, assistance of 
counsel, and avoidance of cruel and unusual punishment!'274 The 
court further stated: 
[a]s to these rights, as well as other important rights listed in 
new section 24, California courts in criminal cases would no 
267. 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948). 
268. Id. at 790. 
269. Id. at 791-93. 
270. Id. at 794. 
271. Id. at 796. 
272. Id. at 798. 
273. Id. 
274. Raven,801 P.2d at 1087 (emphasis added). 
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longer have authority to interpret the> state Constitution in a 
manner more protective of defendants' rights than extended by 
the Federal Constitution, as construed by the United States 
Supreme Court .... Thus, [the new section 24] not only unduly 
restricts judicial power, but it does so in a way which severely 
limits the independent force and effect of the California 
Constitution.215 
Despite this strong support for the doctrine of independent state 
grounds,216 the California Supreme Court has not found that other 
voter-initiated changes to the declaration of rights have amounted to 
revisions even though such changes force the California courts to ad-
here to federal precedent. 
The "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision of Proposition 8 pur-
ported to attack only one instance of the California Supreme Court's 
application of the doctrine of independent state grounds. The court 
held that section 28( d) only eliminated the court-created exclusion of 
evidence remedy for violating an accused's rightS?l1 In Brosnahan v. 
Brown,218 the court however, addressed the issue of revision or 
amendment in general terms and with respect to the proposition as a 
whole. When section 28( d) was later challenged as an impermissible 
revision in In re Lance W., the court relied on its previous, but cur-
sory, conclusion in Brosnahan?19 Meanwhile, the "Right to Truth-in-
Evidence" section of Proposition 8 greatly impeded the court's ability 
to protect the broader rights which the court claimed were not af-
fected by the provision. By restricting courts' use of the exclusionary 
rue, section 28( d) limited the courts' ability to protect Californians' 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, right against 
self-incrimination, and right to access to evidence. 
As to Proposition 115, the court in Raven held that constitutional 
amendments requiring reciprocal discovery,280 allowing joinder of 
cases,281 admitting hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings,282 
275. Id. at 1087-88. 
276. One commentator has asserted that in Raven the court stiffened the distinction 
between a constitutional amendment and a revision. Joseph Goldberg, Note, Raven v. 
Deukmejian: A Modem Guide to the Voter Initiative Process and State Constitutional Inde-
pendence, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729, 738-39 (1991). 
277. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985). 
278. 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982). 
279. Lance w., 694 P.2d at 770. 
280. "In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be 
reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through the initia-
tive process." CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 30(c). 
281. "'This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to prohibit the joining of 
criminal cases as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through the initiative pro-
cess." CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 30(a). 
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prohibiting post-indictment hearings,283 and proclaiming the People's 
right to due process and a speedy and public trial,284 do not constitute 
invalid revisions either "standing alone or in the aggregate."28S Nev-
ertheless, in addition to affecting the ability of California courts to 
independently interpret and protect the rights affected by the above 
provisions, these provisions also limit the affected rights themselves. 
Attempting to distinguish the above changes made by Proposition 115 
from the holding in Lance w., and a similar challenge in People v. 
Frierson,286 the court stated that "the isolated provisions at issue [in 
those cases] achieved no far reaching, fundamental changes in our 
governmental plan."287 The court said that none of the above exam-
ples "involved a broad attack on state court authority to exercise in-
dependent judgment in construing a wide spectrum of important 
rights under the state Constitution."288 
This is not a principled application of the prohibition against con-
stitutional revision through the initiative process. The implications of 
the court's holdings in Raven, Brosnahan, and Frierson are that the 
voters may slowly chip away at the rights declared in Article I, as they 
did with the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision of Proposition 8, 
and sections of Proposition 115. The court will characterize such in-
cremental changes as valid amendments. However, if the voters at-
tempt to accomplish these smaller steps in one fell swoop, they will be 
attempting an invalid revision of the constitution. 
The court must more fully explore the "qualitative" nature of 
constitutional changes which appear to be less sweeping than the 
changes proposed by section 5 of Prop'osition 115 and by the "Califor-
nia Bill of Rights" initiative challenged in McFadden. While the court 
in McFadden relied heavily on the mere "quantitative" nature of the 
changes proposed by the initiative in question, the court also closely 
examined some of the "qualitative" changes. The court looked to the 
282. "In order to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases, hearsay evidence shall 
be admissible at preliminary hearings, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people 
through the initiative process." CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 30(b). 
283. "If a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no postindictment prelimi-
nary hearing." CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 14.1. 
284. "In a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to due 
process of law and to a speedy and public trial." CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 29. 
285. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086. 
286. 599 P.2d 587,613-14 (Cal. 1979) (uphqlding a provision which essentially required 
the California courts in capital cases to interpret the state guarantee against cruel or unu-
sual punishment in a manner consistent with federal precedent). 
287. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089. 
288. [d. 
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fact that the proposition was entitled "California Bill of Rights." The 
court found this presented an apparent conflict with the title and sub-
ject matters in Article I of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of 
Rights."289 Proposition 8 was entitled "The Victims' Bill of 
Rights,"290 which arguably creates confusion with California's Decla-
ration of Rights. Furthermore, although the court in Lance w., deter-
mined that the Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision only eliminated 
a judicially created remedy, this section has been more broadly inter-
preted to extend not only to evidence seized in violation of article I, 
section 13, but also to statements obtained in violation of an accused's 
right against self-incrimination.291 Additionally, the California appel-
late courts have extended section 28(d)'s exclusion of evidence to the 
remedy of dismissal.292 
While the court determined that the reciprocal discovery provi-
sion in Proposition 115 "constitutes a specific exception to the broad 
privilege against self-incrimination,"293 statutory amendments enacted 
by the initiative state that "no discovery shall occur in criminal cases 
except as provided by this chapter, ... or as mandated by the Constitu-
tion of the United States."294 Thus, Proposition 115 not only created 
an "exception" to California's protection against self-incrimination, 
but also declared that the Federal Constitution, rather than the state 
constitution, would provide for any limitations on reciprocal discov-
ery. The effect of this is to take interpretation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination outside the realm of the California courts and to 
leave such interpretation to the federal courts, at least as to limits on 
prosecutorial discovery. The California courts are again deprived of 
their power to independently interpret the state constitution. 
The California Supreme Court should impose a more exacting 
qualitative standard to determine whether an initiative has revised, 
rather than amended, provisions in the Declaration of Rights. There 
is nothing in the court's reasoning in Raven to prevent the voters in 
future initiatives from enacting piecemeal changes to provisions in the 
Declaration of Rights which would have the effect of requiring the 
state courts to follow federal interpretation of similar rights. As the 
289. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 794 (Cal. 1948). 
290. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET; PRIMARy ELECTION 33 (June 8, 1982). 
291. People v. May, 748 P.2d 307 (Cal. 1988) 
292. People v. Epps, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (1986) (holding that where dismissal would 
not be required under the federal constitution, based on the state's failure to preserve 
evidence, Proposition 8 precludes dismissal). 
293. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 314 (Cal. 1991). 
294. Id. at 315 (quoting CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1054). 
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Raven court stated, "forced linkage,,295 would "substantially alter the 
substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of in-
dependent force and effect."296 Despite this confirmation of the Cali-
fornia Constitution's independent nature, these inconsistent holdings 
permit the voters to slowly chip away at the Declaration of Rights' 
independence by voting for specific exceptions to various sections 
over mUltiple elections, rather than adopting one measure to accom-
plish that goal. Because of the broad latitude the California Supreme 
Court has granted to the voters, it is unlikely the court will begin to 
impose a more exacting standard for the "no revision rule." The 
strongest proposal would be a compromise be~een the rights of the 
voters to link California's Declaration of Rights to federal interpreta-
tion, and the rights of all Californians to an independent state 
constitution. 
C. Recent Use of the California Declaration of Rights 
The current California Supreme Court, while granting great def-
erence to the will of the voters, has nonetheless acknowledged the 
importance of the state constitution. Even where the court has ulti-
mately concluded that federal precedent applied, the court has at least 
examined the state constitution. As discussed, the court in Izazaga v. 
Superior Courf297 held that the reciprocal discovery provision enacted 
by Proposition 115 constituted an exception to the state privilege 
against self-incrimination; but the court also held that "the California 
Constitution continues to afford criminal defendants an independent 
source of protection from infringement of certain rights .... "298 In 
addition, the Raven court used strong language to support the impor-
tance of the independent state grounds doctrine. Nonetheless, the 
court's current analysis of when the doctrine should apply is no more 
reasoned than in the days of Brisendine and Disbrow. 
In Tapia v. Superior Court,299 the court held that certain provi-
sions of Proposition 115 could be applied to prosecutions of crimes 
committed before the Proposition's effective date.3OG Robert Allen 
Tapia challenged retroactive application of Proposition 115 on state 
and federal ex post facto grounds. The California Declaration of 
Rights, section 9, provides, "[a] bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or 
295. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 664. 
296. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990). < 
297. 815 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1991); see supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text. 
298. Id., 815 P.2d at 314. 
299. 807 P.2d 434 (Cal. 1991). 
300. Id. at 446. 
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law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed."301 The 
United States Constitution provides "[n]o state shall ... pass any ... 
ex post facto law."302 The court in Tapia appears to have set out a 
framework under which the court will determine whether California's 
constitution should be interpreted differently from equivalent federal 
provisions. First, the court looked to the textual similarities, and con-
cluded nothing in the language of California's provision supported an 
interpretation different from federal interpretation.303 Next, the court 
examined the history of the state provision, and concluded that Cali-
fornia had only followed the broader "substantial protection" analysis 
when forced to do so by the Supremacy Clause.304 While federal pre-
cedent had long adhered to the "substantial protection" analysis, a 
little over two weeks after Proposition 115 was approved, the United 
States Supreme Court had rejected the "substantial protection" analy-
sis in Collins v. Youngblood.305 Finding no "independent footing in 
the state Constitution,,,306 the Tapia court followed the Collins inter-
pretation of the federal ex post facto clause. 
The California Supreme Court is now applying the doctrine of 
independent state grounds backwards. The court should not look for 
a reason to apply the California Constitution, but rather for a reason 
to follow federal interpretation, even where California interpretation 
employs federal precedent. Again, simply because a state court has 
decided to adopt the law of another jurisdiction, this does not forever 
bind that state to the future case law of the other jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, the Tapia court ignored California's "long standing pre-
sumption ... that new nondecisionallaw operates prospectively.,,307 
California courts, in order to preserve the integrity of the state 
constitution, should base decisions first on the text of the state consti-
tution, then on state constitutional and common law, and finally on 
preexisting state law. After a decision is reached based on these ele-
ments of state law, the state court should examine federal law for any 
possible violation.308 The state's Declaration of Rights must receive 
301. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 9. 
302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The United States Constitution imposes a similar 
limitation on the federal government. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
303. Tapia, 807 P.2d at 441. 
304. ld. at 442. 
305. 497 U.S. 37, 44-47 (1990) (restricting application of the ex post facto clause in the 
Federal Constitution). 
306. Tapia, 807 P.2d at 442. 
307. ld. at 448 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
308. This is a variation of criteria set out by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. 
Gunwall,720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986). 
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some insulation from voter whim. in order to give state courts the op-
portunity to independently examine state rights. 
VI. Super Majority Proposal 
There have been a number of proposals for altering the methods 
by which the voters may initiate changes to the constitution, but few 
focus on the need to preserve the doctrine of independent state 
grounds. This dimension of preserving the independence of the state 
constitution adds a layer of complexity to proposals for revamping the 
initiative process. 
Usually the type of proposal offered depends on what the com-
mentator perceives as "the problem." Commentators concerned with 
voter understanding, abuse of the process, and the opportunity for de-
liberation and debate, usually offer proposals which focus on the initi-
ative process. For example, one commentator has urged the adoption 
of expedited legislative involvement.309 
Some states which provide for the initiative only allow "indirect" 
use of the initiative. That is, proponents of a proposition must first 
present the proposal to the state legislature and give that body an op-
portunity to adopt the proposal, or a proposal which is substantially 
similar. If the legislature fails to act, then the proposition usually goes 
on the ballot. States which employ the indirect initiative usually re-
quire a minimal percentage of signatures at the petition stage before 
the proposal will be presented to the legislature. If the legislature fails 
to act, proponents must then obtain additional signatures before sub-
mitting the proposal to the voters.310 This solution presents a number 
of problems. First, it is unlikely the people of California would be 
willing to give up direct access to the ballot. While the state legisla-
ture is certainly more free from domination by interest groups, a situa-
tion which initially spurred the adoption of direct democracy, voters 
will want to maintain the direct check which they now possess. Sec-
ondly, the proposed procedure is too complex and costly for the goals 
it attempts to achieve-complex in that it involves, or could involve, 
all of the other branches of government before anything is submitted 
to the voters. Many proponents of the direct initiative are likely to 
argue that the time lag between the first round of signatures and the 
second would deprive proponents of propositions of the initial enthu-
siasm for their proposals. This accounts for the additional costs. Al- < 
309. Nick Brestoff, Comment, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Re-
form, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 922, 953-58 (1975). 
310. See id. at 924. 
138 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:95 
ready a tremendous amount of resources and time are required just at 
the signature gathering stage.311 To further stretch out this time 
would result in far fewer initiatives surviving. Furthermore, it is likely 
that those which do survive will do so only because the proponents 
have ample funds to keep the proposal alive, and a class bias may 
develop. Finally, this solution does not address the true problem with 
the voter initiative. While the process could benefit from some oppor-
tunity for deliberation and debate before the proposed change reaches 
the signature stage, the proposal described above would not provide 
any additional insulation of the Declaration of Rights from majority 
whim. Even if Propositions 8 and l1S had first been submitted to the 
legislature, and the legislature had expressed concern that certain sec-
tions of these propositions could deprive the state constitution of its 
independence, the proponents of the measures could nonetheless have 
placed the measures on the ballot. While the voters may understand 
the legislature had these concerns, the high emotions and passions sur-
rounding "victims' rights," would probably have spurred the voters to 
adopt the proposals regardless of the opportunity for debate. 
One commentator has expressed concern that the California 
Constitution is in danger of becoming a mere statute.312 This com-
mentator proposes that initiative law be a separate body of law, sub-
ject to the constitution, but superior to legislatively enacted law. The 
proposal would still allow the voters to amend the constitution, but 
only by a two-thirds or sixty percent vote, rather than a simple major-
ity.313 While this proposal would provide greater protection to Article 
I of the California Constitution, it would restrict the voters with re-
spect to the remaining articles. The rest of the constitution is by now 
far too detailed to justify this type of limitation. Unless the rest of the 
constitution can be "cleaned up," the voters should not be restricted 
from amending the other articles. 
Other commentators have proposed several methods to check 
voter whim and caprice. Each proposal, however, would leave the fi-
nal determination of validity to the federal courts. One commentator 
discusses the lack of the types of "checks" in the initiative process 
which are inherent in the legislative process, and states that this differ-
ence should compel greater judicial scrutiny of initiatives than of legis-
lative acts.314 But this commentator also acknowledges that most 
311. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 61-70. 
312. Note, California'S Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REv. 279 (1949). 
313. Id. at 287-88. 
314. Eule, supra note 193, at 1558-73. 
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states which allow for the initiative also allow for voter recall of 
judges.315 The commentator then suggests that the protection of mi-
nority rights be left to the federal courts. As this article has discussed, 
when the federal courts began to shirk their duty as "guardians of 
minority rights,"316 states began looking to their own constitutions in 
order to maintain, and even expand the rights available in the Federal 
Constitution. By surrendering their ability to protect these rights to 
the federal courts, state constitutions will lose all of their indepen-
dence, and may lead one to question the reason for retaining state 
declarations of rights. 
Former Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, Hans Linde, 
has argued for enforcement of the "guaranty clause" with respect to 
initiatives.317 He acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court 
has held that issues regarding the guaranty clause are non-justiciable 
political questions. He argues, however, that this should not prevent 
state courts from interpreting the clause. This proposal also fails be-
cause even if a state supreme court held an initiative violated the 
guaranty clause, the decision could be appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, which would either summarily reverse the decision, 
or provide an opinion' stating that such issues are non-justiciable. 
Once again, the ultimate issue would be left to the federal courts and 
state constitutional independence would be undercut. 
Proposing substantive restrictions on amending the Declaration 
of Rights by initiative, would be an attractive option, but is fraught 
with problems. FIrst, such a limitation would put the burden on the 
courts to determine when an initiative has violated the rule. As dis-
cussed with respect to other restrictions enforceable by the judiciary, 
namely the single-subject and no revision rules, courts are very hesi-
tant to apply these rules strictly to initiatives, and historically hav~ 
granted initiatives great deference. This is unavoidable when judges 
may be recalled by the voters and are thus directly accountable to 
them. Secondly, Propositions 8 and 115 have already taken away 
rights previously preserved by other sections of article I, under the 
guise of adding new rights-the rights of victims. There is no princi-
pled method for distinguishing between the limitation or elimination 
of certain rights and the granting of "new" rights, except perhaps in 
extreme cases. 
315. Id. at 1579-82. 
316. Id. at 1542. 
317. Hans A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government?", 17 
HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 159, 160-61 (1989). 
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Another possible solution would be to revise the constitution to 
restrict the voters' ability to amend the constitution to only articles II 
through XXXIV. In other words, insulate all of article I by prohibit-
ing any amendments by initiative. As tempting as this proposal may 
be, it too presents significant problems. Voters are extremely protec-
tive of their right to participate directly in the law-making process, 
and would likely vehemently resist an attempt to put any initiative 
aspect completely beyond their reach. Moreover, such a limitation 
would deprive the voters of the opportunity to define and enact "new" 
rights. For example, the right to privacy was not expressly provided 
for in the state constitution until the voters approved the provision in 
1974. While one might disagree with the way voters have expressed 
the "rights of victims," rights are evolving, and not static. To place the 
Declaration of Rights completely beyond the reach of the voters 
would deprive the Californian people of the opportunity to express 
new rights. 
The Massachusetts Constitution protects rights from alterations 
by the electorate. Massachusetts allows only indirect initiatives, and 
further forbids any changes affecting freedom of speech, press, elec-
tions, assembly, just compensation, and the right of access to the 
courts.318 As a result, since the initiative was adopted in Massachu-
setts, there have been only two constitutional amendments pro-
posed.319 In Illinois, the only initiatives which the voters may propose 
are constitutional amendments affecting the state legislature.32o While 
these types of limitations would certainly insulate California's Decla-
ration of Rights, it is likely that the voters of California would not 
accept putting anything completely beyond their reach. 
A super-majority proposal is clearly the most superior. This pro-
posal achieves a balance between the competing interests of the vot-
ers' right to make law, and the right of all Californians to a 
constitution which is independent of the Federal Constitution. As 
simplistic as it may sound, the voters may continue to propose amend-
ments to the state's Declaration of Rights by obtaining the same per-
centage of signatures as are now required, but an amendment to the 
Declaration of Rights will only become law if passed by a super ma-
jority of three-fourths, or seventy-five percent, of voters who vote in 
318. MAss. CaNST. amend. art. XLVIII. 
319. DUBOIS, supra note 189, at 16. 
320. ILL. CaNST. art. XIV, § 3. 
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the election.321 Currently, an initiative becomes law if passed by a 
simple majority of those who vote on that initiative. The percentage 
should be based on the number of voters who participate in the partic-
ular election because some voters may refrain from voting on some 
measures. Voters may refrain from voting on an initiative which is 
farther down the list of initiatives, or simply because they do not un-
derstand the particular initiative.322 Such disinterest and confusion 
should be considered when detennining whether an initiative becomes 
law. 
The percentage for passage, rather than the percentage for quali-
fication for the ballot, is important because voters, for a variety of 
reasons, will sign petitions without reading or fully understanding 
them.323 Some, for instance, may sign as a result of peer pressure; 
others may sign simply to get the signature gatherer to move on, and 
still others may sign without understanding that they are qualifying 
the proposition for the ballot. By concentrating on the numbers 
needed for passage, only those amendments to the Declaration of 
Rights which are meritorious, and not simply a result of whim or ca-
price, will be enacted. Proposition 8 passed by a majority of 56.4%,324 
and Proposition 115 passed by 57.03% of the vote.325 
Rather than attempt to make it more difficult for the voters to 
amend any portion of the Constitution, this proposal is limited to the 
Declaration of Rights, which sets forth individual fundamental rights. 
This is because of the structural argument that declarations of rights 
are different from other parts of a constitution.326 Furthermore, ex-
tending this proposal to the entire California Constitution would sim-
ply be impractical. The reality of the situation in California is that 
articles IT through XXXIV, while laying down some enduring princi-
ples, are replete with details, and require regular fine-tuning and re-
finement. Ideally, California should streamline its constitution and 
place many of the constitutional sections within its statutory law; this 
is unlikely to occur, however, due the extreme detail already present 
321. The California Constitution requires a super-majority vote with respect to local 
debts. CAL. CoNST. art. XVI, § 18 ("No county, city, town, township, board of education, 
or school district, shall incur any indebtedness ... exceeding in any year the income and 
revenue provided for such year, ... without the assent of two-thirds of the quaIified elec-
tors thereof'). 
322. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 142-44. 
323. Id. at 62-64. 
324. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE; PRIMARY ELECllON 45 (June 8, 
1982). 
325. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE 8 (June 5, 1990). 
326. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
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in the constitution. For this reason, as well as those set out earlier, this 
Article's proposal is limited to California's Declaration of Rights. 
Finally, this proposal does not simply argue the broader view that 
more rights are always better and that voters should not be able to 
override California Supreme Court opinions which provide for 
broader protection of rights than guaranteed under the federal consti-
tution. While all Californians might well benefit from broader rights, 
this Article's main concern is with the limitations on the California 
judiciary's ability to independently examine the state constitution. 
Propositions 8 and 115 have been interpreted to link state interpreta-
tion to federal precedent, which effectively deprives the state constitu-
tion of its independence arid the California judiciary' of its ability to 
consider unique circumstances. 
Furthermore, such linkage will force California courts to defer 
"all judicial interpretive power" to the federal courtS.327 If a particu-
lar California Supreme Court ruling makes voters unhappy, the voters 
may alter those rulings. 
Some might criticize this proposal as result-oriented. Not only 
does it seek to preserve individual and sometimes unpopular rights, it 
also seeks to preserve the integrity of California's Declaration of 
Rights. More important than insulating individual rights from voter 
caprice, is the goal of maintaining the. independence of California'S 
courts to interpret the state constitution, and not be forced to look 
only to federal interpretation of similar rights. 
This analysis and proposal should not be read as mere disagree-
ment with expressing rights for crime victims. There is merit to such 
rights, but the creation and protection of victims' rights should not 
result in a chipping away of rights possessed by all Californians, and 
should not strip California's Declaration of Rights of its independence 
from the United States Constitution. 
327 .. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d Ur/7, 1086 (Cal. 1990). 
